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Abstract
In many important application domains of machine learning, data is a privacy-
sensitive resource. In addition, due to the growing complexity of the models,
single actors typically do not have sufficient data to train a model on their own.
Motivated by these challenges, we propose Secret Gradient Descent (SecGD), a
method for training machine learning models on data that is spread over different
clients while preserving the privacy of the training data. We achieve this by letting
each client add temporary noise to the information they send to the server during
the training process. They also share this noise in separate messages with the
server, which can then subtract it from the previously received values. By routing
all data through an anonymization network such as Tor, we prevent the server from
knowing which messages originate from the same client, which in turn allows us
to show that breaking a client’s privacy is computationally intractable as it would
require solving a hard instance of the subset sum problem. This setup allows
SecGD to work in the presence of only two honest clients and a malicious server,
and without the need for peer-to-peer connections.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) has shown impressive success across many domains, enabled by increasingly
complex models requiring large amounts of training data. Ever more data is being collected, and it
is collected in ever more places: from phones, smartwatches, Internet-of-things devices, cars, etc.
At first glance, it seems as though this abundance of data should solve the problem of data-hungry
models—if only we could pool the data from all the different places. The caveat is that much modern
data is privacy-sensitive.
Hence, ironically, while the rate at which data is being produced is ever-increasing, data collection
and pooling has in a certain sense become not easier but harder, both because of new data protection
laws such as the GDPR [14] and because of more awareness in the wake of data scandals such as
those surrounding Cambridge Analytica [28] or Strava [19].
A straightforward approach to mitigate privacy concerns would be to add noise to datasets before
merging them. However, this would require so much noise that it would render the data essentially
useless [11, 15]. There are more sophisticated ways of adding noise [20], but the fundamental tradeoff
between privacy and utility always remains. A different possible tradeoff must be made between
privacy on one side and communication cost on the other side; cryptographic methods generally
belong to this domain. A downside of these methods is that they typically make trust assumptions on
the clients or the server [6, 8].
Contributions: SecGD. In this paper we propose Secret Gradient Descent (SecGD), a method that
allows for training arbitrary ML models via gradient-based methods on distributed data. It provides
a fairly strong privacy guarantee with very small trust assumptions and can be extended to provide
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differential privacy with very small noise addition. In standard distributed gradient descent, clients
compute the gradient of the loss function on their local datasets in each step and send these gradients
back to a central server for summation. The main idea of SecGD is to let clients add noise to their
gradients prior to sending them in a way that makes them lose any information about the original
gradients, thereby making them useless for the extraction of sensitive information about a client’s
dataset. Their usefulness for model training is restored in a second step, where the negative value
of the noise is sent to the server through an anonymization network such as Tor [31]. Adding this
negative noise to the sum of the noisy gradients yields the sum of the original gradients. However, no
single local gradient can be recovered, because in the anonymization network the noise vectors of all
clients are mixed, making them unlinkable to a specific noisy local gradient.
Properties of SecGD. During the training process, the server learns nothing but the global gradient,
that is, the sum over the local gradients that are computed on the individual distributed datasets.
SecGD belongs to second kind of approaches mentioned in the beginning: it trades communication
cost against privacy. An summary can be found in Sec. 4.5. These are the key properties of SecGD:
• Main idea: privacy by adding and canceling noise.
• Computational privacy guarantee: compromising privacy would require solving hard in-
stances of the multidimensional subset sum problem, which is computationally intractable.
• Trust assumptions: at least two honest clients; an anonymization network such as Tor [31].
• Increase of communication compared to standard distributed gradient descent by only a
logarithmic factor in the number of users and the number of parameters of the ML model.
• No need for peer-to-peer connections between clients.
• Noise-efficient extension to ensure differential privacy for the global gradient.
• Limitation to settings where clients have a stable Internet connection and are unlikely to
drop out during a training iteration.
Despite the limitation mentioned last, SecGD applies to many situations of practical importance, e.g.,
multiple hospitals that each collect patient data and want to pool the data across hospitals to answer
research questions; a franchise company that wants to analyze customer behavior via purchase logs in
its different branches; or a vendor of server software that wants to improve its product’s performance
by optimizing it for common usage patterns. In the last example, the software would collect usage
statistics that the vendor would like to use to train an ML model on a central server.
2 Related Work
There are two inherently different approaches towards protecting privacy when training ML models on
distributed data via gradient based methods: by adding noise or by using cryptographic or information
theoretic approaches.
The former leads to differential privacy guarantees by adding independent noise to the gradients
before sending them to the server [12]. However, in this standard form large amounts of noise need
to be added since each client’s data needs to be protected individually without being able to rely on
other clients. We discuss this topic in more detail in Sec. 5.4.
Cryptographic approaches based on homomorphic encryption [2, 3] typically try to protect a private
client’s data from an aggregating server but not from other clients. Clients encrypt their gradients
with the same key before sending them to the server, which then performs model updates in the
encrypted space. The resulting model can be decrypted by the clients. The encryption scheme of
Shi et al. [30] allows the clients to encrypt their gradient with different keys, but requires a trusted
setup phase with a trusted server, or communication between the clients. Methods based on generic
secure multiparty computation use secret sharing [5], where a secret value is distributed between
the clients in several parts such that a certain number of them is required to reconstruct it. These
protocols require communication between the clients and often a large number of honest clients [6, 9].
Methods without this last restriction [26] still need direct communication between clients, which
might not be possible in, e.g., the setting from the introduction where the vendor of a server software
wants to gather usage statistics, since especially database servers often only allow connections from a
whitelist of IP addresses for security reasons. Bonawitz et al. [8] proposed a protocol that is based on
a similar idea as ours, i.e., adding noise that cancels out later. However, it requires a trusted server to
distribute keys in the setup phase. Trusting an already established distributed public infrastructure
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(Tor) as in our case typically comes with a much lower risk than having to trust a single party that
sets up and manages a server with software that is used for only one specific application.
3 Problem Definition
In our setting, there are N clients, each with a share Di of a dataset D. Think of, e.g., different hospitals,
each with a database with information about their patients. Clients are connected via the Internet to a
(potentially malicious) server that wants to train an ML model on the whole dataset D via gradient
descent: The gradients are real-valued vectors inRd and the parameter vector wt of the ML model gets
updated by an equation of the form wt+1← wt −η t ( 1N gt +∇wR(wt)), where t indicates the training
step, η t is the learning rate and R the regularizer. gt is the global gradient, i.e., the sum over the
gradients gti of the loss function L computed on the local datasets: g
t = ∑Ni=1 gti = ∑
N
i=1∇wL(wt ,Di).
To update wt , the only information that server needs from the clients is gt , and we want to prevent it
from learning more than what is absolutely necessary for the model updates.
Training goal and adversarial model. The server should have access to the global gradients gt to
train the ML model. At the same time, we want to prevent it from learning any of the local gradients
gti , because they might contain sensitive information about a client’s dataset. We assume that the
server is actively malicious: In order to break privacy and to learn any of the gti , it may deviate from
the training protocol. In addition, the server may collude with any but two clients, which may deviate
from the protocol as well.
Note that SecGD can be used to securely sum up any kind of vectors. We build our exposition around
gradient descent, though, since this is one of the most important applications. In gradient descent, the
sum gt of the local vectors might still contain sensitive information. Preventing their extraction is a
problem orthogonal to ours, but in Sec. 5.4 we describe how a differentially private mechanism can
be combined with SecGD to solve it in our case.
4 Proposed Solution: Secret Gradient Descent
An observation also used in other privacy protocols [8] is that when computing a sum, it does not
matter if one adds additional summands that sum up to 0. Instead of adding a 0 sum directly, our
method operates in two steps: first, random vectors are subtracted from the gradients to obfuscate
them, then the same vectors are added again.
4.1 Preprocessing
For our solution we need to represent the entries of the gradient vectors as elements from the group
Z2m , i.e., the integers modulo 2m for an integer m. Here, 2m is an upper bound on the entries of
the global gradient gt , derived from an upper bound 2m˜ on the entries of the local gradients and the
number N of users: m = dlog(N) m˜e. The clients can transform their real-valued gradient vectors to
elements from Z2m in a preprocessing step that we detail in Appendix 4.1.
4.2 Protocol
Main idea. The idea behind SecGD is to first add noise to the gradients prior to sending them, let
the server sum them up to obtain a noisy version of gt , and to then tell the server how much noise
was added so that it can remove the noise from gt . However, the noise vectors of the different clients
get mixed throughout the process, turning the reconstruction of any of the gti into a computationally
hard subset sum problem. So instead of sending one message containing gti , each client additionally
generates K independent random vectors sti1, . . . ,s
t
iK and sends the following K+1 messages:
g˜ti := g
t
i−
K
∑
k=1
stik, s
t
i1, . . . , s
t
iK .
To obtain gt , the server simply has to sum up all messages it received in the t-th training round, so
from the utility perspective nothing has changed over regular distributed gradient descent. What
about privacy? If the server knows which of the messages were sent by the same client i, summing
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them up reveals gti—exactly what we want to avoid. The server has two ways to link messages from
the same client with each other: (1) via their content and (2) via the metadata of the network packages.
We will discuss both of those in the following two paragraphs.
Package content. For making the messages unlinkable via the vectors they contain, we need to make
them, or at least the stik, all look the same. This can easily be done by sampling them independently
from the same distribution. We, however, also do not want g˜ti itself to carry any information about g
t
i .
This could for example happen if K were small and the stik were sampled from a distribution with
small variance. This is why we choose the uniform distribution on Zd2m for the additional summands,
that is, stik∼U (Zd2m) i.i.d. As a consequence, g˜ti , too, is uniformly distributed on Zd2m . Furthermore,
any K-element subset of the K+1 messages a client sends is statistically independent. In Sec. 5 we
show that the information that still remains in the set of messages cannot be used by a computationally
bounded adversary if we choose K = dm/2 (we do not have to send dm/2 vectors; cf. Sec. 4.3).
Metadata. There are two types of metadata that the server receives, (1) the IP address from which a
package was sent and (2) the time at which a package arrives. To make this information useless, we
first route all messages through an anonymization network, such as Tor [31], or through a similar
proxy server infrastructure, thereby removing all information that was originally carried by the IP
address. Second, to remove any information that the arrival times of packages might contain, we set
the length of one training iteration to n seconds and make clients send their packages not all at once,
but spread them randomly over the n seconds, thus making the packages’ arrival times useless for
attacks. Without this measure, all update packages from the same user might be sent right after one
another, and the server would receive groups of packages with larger breaks after each group and
could thus assume that each such group contains all packages from exactly one user.
Malicious adversary. So far we worked under the assumption that the server is honest but curious,
i.e., that it might try to infer additional information from the data it receives but that it at least honestly
follows the protocol. Due to the nature of our protocol, the only way the server could deviate from it
would be to send different parameter vectors or different additional organizational information (such
as the length of a training period) to different clients. In order to prevent this, we give clients a way to
recognize when the server violates the protocol: Instead of requesting the current parameter vectors
and information once from the server, the clients request it multiple times per iteration. Only if they
get the same response every time do they respond; otherwise they must assume an attack. Since the
clients’ requests are routed through an anonymization network, the server cannot identify subsequent
requests from the same client and cannot maliciously send the same spurious data every time. To
reduce communication costs, the clients do not actually request the data multiple times, but only
once in the beginning, and afterwards request hashes of it. As an even safer countermeasure, one
could distribute the data that would otherwise be obtained directly from the server via a blockchain.
This way, each user would be able to verify the integrity of the data they receive. In the initial setup
phase, the server also has to tell each client the total number of clients N so that they can compute m,
the number of bits to use for their vectors. Lying about N, however, would not give the server any
significant advantage since it would have to lie to all clients in the same way. We go more into detail
about this in Sec. 5.3.
4.3 Improving Communication Efficiency
It is not necessary to send the stik as vectors, which would be of the same, potentially high, dimension
as the gradient. Instead, the server and the clients agree on a common random number generator
(RNG) beforehand, e.g., by hardcoding it. A client then generates K seeds Sti1, . . . ,S
t
iK and uses the
RNG to compute sti1, . . . ,s
t
iK . It then sends the vector g˜
t
i and the scalars S
t
i1, . . . ,S
t
iK , which are used
by the server to compute sti1, . . . ,s
t
iK once again.
How many bits do we need for the seeds? Using seeds with fewer bits than the random vectors that
are generated from them increases the probability of collisions, i.e., two users generating the same
seeds and hence the same random vectors by chance. This might weaken the hardness guarantee in
Sec. 5.2. As we will see later, only collisions between the vectors of two of the users are to be avoided.
If q is the number of bits used for the seeds, we can easily upper bound the collision probability p by
assuming that the event of the collision of any two seeds is independent of the event of the collision
of any two other seeds. We can then arrange the seeds in a list and compute the probability that the
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second seed collides with the first one, the probability that the third seed collides with the first or the
second one and so on. Summing up yields p≤ 2K(2K−1)2 12q . For a desired target probability p, we
need to choose q = log
(
2K(2K−1)
2p
)
. For d = 106 dimensions, an encoding length of m = 30 bits, a
collision probability of p = 10−10 and the most secure choice for K, namely K = dm/2 (cf. Sec. 5),
only 82 bits are required per seed.
4.4 Computation and Communication Cost
For the runtime and communication analysis we will assume that the computation of the gradients
gti takes time in the order of the bit length, O(dm˜), where m˜ is the number of bits used to represent
each gradient entry. dm˜ is the size of the output of the gradient computation and hence a lower
bound; a higher computation time would favor our protocol because it would reduce the multiplicative
overhead of our method. We further assume that the parameter vector w is encoded using one 32
bit float per dimension. We analyze a single training iteration. In the baseline case where each
client sends their gradient directly, the runtime complexity for a client is O(dm˜), for the server it is
O(Ndm˜). Each client needs to request the parameters from the server and send the gradient, which
are d(32+ m˜) bits in total.
Moving to SecGD, we show in the next section that the most secure choice for K is K = dm/2. For this
parameter choice, every client has to sample dm/2 random seeds, generate the corresponding random
vectors and add them to their gradient. This has complexity O(d2m2). The server also has to generate
those random vectors and add them up, leading to a complexity of O(Nd2m2) =O(N log(N)2d2m˜2).
Each client needs to receive the model parameters and send both the sum of the gradient and
the random vectors, together with the seeds. These are O(32d + dm+Kq) = O(dm log(dm)) =
O(dm˜ log(N) log(dm˜ log(N))) bits.
To conclude, the computation increases by a factor of O(dm˜ log(N)2) and the communication by a
factor of O(log(N) log(dm˜ log(N))) over directly sending the gradients, for both the clients and the
server.
4.5 SecGD in a Nutshell
SecGD operates in the group Zd2m , to which real valued vectors must be mapped. In each training
iteration, the server sends the current parameters wt to the clients, which then compute the gradients
gti w.r.t. their local dataset. They sample K = dm/2 random seeds, use them to generate K uniformly
random vectors in Zd2m and subtract them from their gradient to obtain g˜ti . Then they send g˜ti and the
random seeds through an anonymization network to the server. The server uses the seeds to generate
the corresponding random vectors, and adds them to the vectors g˜ti it has received to get the global
gradient gt , which it uses to update the model parameters. See Fig. 1 for a graphical overview of
SecGD.
5 Privacy Guarantee
The privacy guarantee we give is very similar to differential privacy. It says that it is impossible
for the server to gain any knowledge—apart from what can be learned from the global gradient
alone—about whether a certain client took part in the training process or not, given full knowledge
about the client’s gradients h1, . . . ,hT in all training iterations. If this is impossible in the setting
of full knowledge, then the server will not be able to learn anything given incomplete knowledge.
We will first ignore possible information leakage from the global gradient and will describe a noise
addition technique to prevent it in Sec. 5.4. Combining this with Thm. 1 yields a differential privacy
guarantee for the global gradient.
Theorem 1. Assume that there exist at least two honest clients and that the set of subset sum problems
with dm uniformly distributed d-dimensional vectors with encoding length m per entry and the sum
consisting of dm/2 summands is computationally hard (cf. Sec. 5.1). Then a computationally bounded
server is not able to prove that with positive probability for a given list of vectors h1, . . . ,hT ∈ Zd2m
there exists a client i among the set of honest clients and an iteration t such that ht = gti , if this cannot
be learned from gt alone.
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t-th training step
Server Client i
Send model parameters wt
Compute local gradient gti ← ∇wL(wt ,Di)
Sample seeds Sti1, . . . ,S
t
iK
stik← RNG(Stik), . . . ,stiK ← RNG(StiK)
Send g˜ti = g
t
i−
K
∑
k=1
stik
Send sti1, . . . ,s
t
iK
st11← RNG(St11), . . . ,stNK ← RNG(StNK)
Compute global gradient gt ←
N
∑
i=1
(
g˜ti +
K
∑
k=1
stik
)
Update model wt+1← wt −η t
(
1
N
gt +λ∇R(wt)
)
Figure 1: One step of the training procedure with SecGD.
We say “with positive probability” because the server will not necessarily be able to definitely prove,
even with unlimited computational power, that there exists a client that had a specific gradient in a
specific iteration, but only whether this is possible or not, i.e., whether the answer to the decision
problem from Sec. 5.1 is true or false. We further point out that the privacy guarantee against the
server automatically yields the same privacy guarantee against other clients since we allow the server
to collude with all but two clients.
Intuition. Thm. 1 is a strong guarantee: If the server is not even able to determine whether a
specific client participated in the training, then it certainly will not be able to infer any other kind of
information (e.g., a part of their dataset) about a client from the training data. This holds even in the
case when the server has arbitrary side information about the client to be attacked, e.g., when the
server knows some entries of a gradient and wants to infer the rest of its entries. For example, assume
that each dataset corresponds to one person and that one of the features in the dataset is the age of the
client, another one whether they have cancer. Then the server will not be able to tell whether one of
the persons has a given age z, and hence definitely not whether a person of age z has cancer or not.
The proof consists of first showing that the task of detecting a given gradient is equivalent to solving
a certain instance of subset sum (Sec. 5.1) and then showing that these instances are hard (Sec. 5.2).
In the proof we allow the server to know which of the messages sent by the users are of the type
g˜ti and which are of the type s
t
ik. This is the case when using the more efficient way of sending
the stik as random seeds instead of vector (see Sec. 4.3). Since the s
t
ik arrive in a random order
and are all independent and identically distributed, from the server’s perspective they just form
one big multiset of messages, and the g˜ti form another multiset, which we will together denote by
Mt = ({{at1, . . . ,atN}},{{bt1, . . . ,btNK}}), where we use the notation {{·}} for multisets. The complexity
guarantee we give is based on the multi-dimensional subset sum problem [13, 21]:
Definition 2 (d-dimensional Decisional Subset Sum Problem). Given n vectors V = {{v1, . . . ,vn}}
and a vector w in Zd2m , decide whether there exists a submultiset V˜ ⊂V such that ∑v∈V˜ v = w.
Note that we can reduce the search version of this problem (finding a suitable V˜ ) to the decision
version and the other way around [24]. We will now show that the problem instances described in
Thm. 1 are equivalent to a certain set of d-dimensional Subset Sum (d-SSS) instances, and will then
show that these instances are computationally hard.
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5.1 Equivalence to d-SSS
As we will explain in the last sentence of this subsection, we may assume w.l.o.g. that the server is
only given the messages Mt0 = ({{at01 , . . . ,at0N}},{{bt01 , . . . ,bt0NK}}) from a single training iteration t0,
where all vector entries are encoded with m bits. We assume further that at least two clients are honest,
w.l.o.g. clients 1 and 2, and that in the case where one of the gradients that the server is searching for
was sent in iteration t0, it was sent by either client 1 or client 2. For the moment we will ignore the
messages of all other clients. We hence work with the messages ({{at01 ,at02 }},{{bt01 , . . . ,bt02K}}), and
the task of the adversarial server is to determine whether there exists a K-element submultiset V˜ of
{{bt01 , . . . ,bt02K}} such that either at01 +∑v˜∈V˜ v˜= ht0 or at02 +∑v˜∈V˜ v˜= ht0 . We can equivalently formulate
this as proving or disproving the existence of a submultiset V˜ such that either ∑v˜∈V˜ v˜ = ht0 −at01 or
∑v˜∈V˜ v˜= ht0−at02 . Since the noisy gradients at01 and at02 are uniformly random, the right sides of these
two equations are uniformly random too. Thus, the server’s task is equivalent to solving a d-SSS
problem with a multiset of uniformly random vectors, a uniformly random target sum w, and the
additional constraint that the submultiset V˜ needs to be of cardinality K.
The messages of clients other than 1 or 2 are independent of those of clients 1 and 2 and can therefore
be ignored as pure noise. Including them would only increase the chance of false positives, i.e.,
solutions to the d-SSS search problem that do not correspond to a set of vectors sent by a single client.
Furthermore, the d-SSS instances resulting from different training iterations are clearly independent,
so the assumption from the beginning of this subsection that the server only has access to the data
from one training iteration can be made w.l.o.g.
5.2 Hardness Guarantee
We now show that the set of d-SSS instances from Sec. 5.1, which an adversary would have to solve,
is computationally hard for the parameter choice K = dm/2. In the one-dimensional case and without
the additional constraint, this has been done already in 1996 by Impagliazzo and Naor [21]. The proof
can be extended to our setting. We first formalize the problem using a similar notation as Impagliazzo
and Naor, but invert it: Whereas in their case the number of vectors K is fixed, we fix the encoding
length m and write K as a function of m:
Definition 3. Let B = {{b1, . . . ,b2K(m)}} be a multiset of vectors drawn uniformly and independently
from Zd2m . SecGD SSS is the problem of inverting the function fB(S) = (B,∑b∈S b), where S is a
uniformly randomly drawn submultiset of B with cardinality K(m).
Note that S can be represented as a vector t ∈ {0,1}2K(m) with L1-norm equal to K(m) (bi ∈ S iff
ti = 1), which we will do in the following. We are interested in hard instances of this problem,
depending on the number of vectors 2K(m), i.e., instances for which the function from Def. 3 is hard
to invert. For this we extend the usual definition of one-way functions [17] to sequences of functions
{ fn}, where fn is used for inputs of length n and may be random. In our case, fn/2K(m)dm = fB for a
multiset B of 2K(m) d-dimensional random vectors and an encoding length of m.
Definition 4 ([21]). Let { fn} be a sequence of (potentially random) functions defined on Dn ⊂{0,1}n
and let f ∗ :
⋃
n Dn→{0,1}∗ be defined by its restrictions to the Dn: f ∗|Dn = fn. { fn} is one-way if
the following two conditions hold:
• f ∗(t) is computable in polynomial time for every t ∈⋃n Dn.
• Let {tn} be a sequence of uniformly random inputs, tn∼U (Dn) i.i.d. For every prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm A (that attempts to invert f ∗) and for all c > 0,
Pr( f ∗(A( f ∗(tn))) = f ∗(tn))< n−c for all sufficiently large n.
Since solving the search version of SecGD SSS is exactly the problem of inverting a function fn, we
call sets of instances for which the corresponding sequence { fn} is one-way hard [21]. In our case,
sets of instances are defined by the number of messages as a function of the encoding length 2K(m).
Using this definition, the hardest instances are those for which 2K(m) = dm:
Theorem 5 (cf. [21, Prop. 1.2]).
1. Let 2K′(m)≤ 2K(m)≤ dm. If SecGD SSS is hard for K′(m), then it is also hard for K(m).
2. Let dm≤ 2K(m)≤ 2K′(m). If SecGD SSS is hard for K′(m), then it is also hard for K(m).
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For the proof of Thm. 5 we need to characterize the SecGD SSS instances in the two different cases.
In the first case the function fB is almost injective, while in the second case it is almost surjective
with all values in its range occuring almost the same number of times.
Definition 6 ([21, 22]). Let D be a probability distribution on {0,1}n. We say D is quasi-random
within ε , if for all U ⊂ {0,1}n we have that |PrD(U)−|U |/2n|< ε .
Lemma 7 (cf. [21, Prop.1.1]).
1. Let 2K(m)≤ cdm for c < 1. Let B and S both be chosen uniformly at random. Except with
probability exponentially small, there is no S′ 6= S such that fB(S) = fB(S′).
2. Let 2K(m)≥ cdm for c > 1. Let B be chosen uniformly at random. Except with probability
exponentially small (w.r.t. the choice of B), the distribution given by fB(S) for a randomly
chosen S is quasi-random (w.r.t. S) within an exponentially small amount.
Thm. 5 can now easily be deduced from Lemma 7 (see [21]). Assume we have an algorithm that
efficiently solves SecGD SSS for instances with 2K(m) vectors where the function K is chosen
such that fB is almost injective. Instances with 2K′(m) < 2K(m) vectors can be transformed into
instances with 2K(m) vectors by removing enough of the least significant bits. This adds only few
false positives, i.e., solutions to the inversion of fB, due to instances with 2K(m) vectors being almost
injective. Similarly, if we have an algorithm for instances with 2K(m) vectors where fB is almost
uniform, we transform instances with 2K′(m) > 2K(m) vectors by adding random bits at the end.
Every solution to the modified problem is a solution to the original problem, and we do not lose many
solutions because the sums fB(S) are almost uniformly distributed for 2K(m) vectors.
The proof of Lemma 7 can be found in the Appendix B and closely follows that of Prop. 1.1 from
Impagliazzo and Naor [21]. For the first part we use a simple union bound while for the second part
we rely on the Leftover Hash Lemma from Santha and Vazirani [29].
5.3 Hardness in Practice
One-dimensional SSS is an NP hard problem [25], its multi-dimensional generalization therefore is
as well. However, multi-dimensional SSS has been mostly neglected by the research community so
far, apart from a negative result about its approximability [13]. One-dimensional subset sum, on the
other hand, has a long history of study. Similar to this paper, instances are typically characterized
in terms of the ratio of the number of messages n and their encoding length l(n), where the optimal
choice for security is l(n) = n [21]. For l(n)> 1.06n, SSS can be transformed into a lattice shortest
vector problem [23, 10] that can be solved efficiently for certain instances but is, like SSS, NP hard in
the general case. For l(n) =O(log(n)), there exists a very efficient dynamic programming solution
[16]. Instances with l(n) = n are hard instances in the same sense as in our paper: The number of
possible summands equals the number of bits per summand. For them the fastest algorithms still
require exponential time. The fastest traditional algorithm runs in O˜(20.291n) [4], the fastest quantum
algorithm in time O˜(20.226n) [7], where the notation O˜ suppresses polynomial factors. Thus, despite
significant efforts, no efficient algorithm has been found for the hardest set of one-dimensional SSS
instances and it seems likely that this will be also the case for its multi-dimensional counterpart. Note
that for small n, the problem is still solvable. This translates to both d and m being small. Since
m = dlog(N) m˜e and the server could lie to the clients about N, in the case of d being small, m˜ has to
be chosen sufficiently large. Because this choice is transparent to the clients, they are able to detect
when the server chooses a too small value and can refuse to participate in the training.
5.4 Protecting the Global Gradient via Differential Privacy
Up to this point we allowed the server to learn the exact global gradient gt and ensured that the server
cannot learn anything about the clients’ data beyond what can be learned from gt . In practice this is
often not sufficient to keep the data private. Just the value of the global gradient can already reveal
the values of all local gradients gti; for an example, see Appendix C. This problem can be solved
by adding noise to the gti to ensure differential privacy [12]. Let us assume that we want to achieve
a certain privacy level (ε,δ ) and that the corresponding necessary variance when adding Gaussian
noise is σ2. In standard distributed gradient descent we would have to add N (0,σ2I) to each gti ,
resulting inN (0,Nσ2I) noise for gt . When using SecGD, however, the local gradients are already
protected and we only need to ensure differential privacy for the global gradient. If we assume that
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there are N˜ honest clients, then each of them only has to add N (0,σ2/N˜I) to their gti to ensure a
final noise of at leastN (0,σ2I). Thus, the noise added to gt will be onlyN (0,(1+N− N˜)σ2I). A
more detailed exposition can be found in Appendix C.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we developed SecGD, a protocol for training ML models on distributed data via gradient
based methods in a privacy-preserving fashion. It only requires two honest clients and no peer-to-peer
connections between clients. We achieve our privacy guarantees by adding noise that cancels out
later, and routing messages through an anonymization network. We use this network as a building
block and are therefore not concerned with weaknesses of specific implementations such as TOR.
Also, making as few assumptions as we do does not come without a cost. If a client drops out during
a training round, the round has to be restarted, since the incomplete sum that the server receives is
uniformly randomly distributed on the entire range Zd2m . Hence, SecGD is best suited for settings
where clients have stable connections to the server. This restriction might be relaxed by drawing the
noise stik not from the uniform distribution but from a distribution with smaller variance. This would
require adapting the complexity analysis and would yield differential privacy guarantees for the noisy
gradients g˜ti . We leave this for future work, as well as ensuring correctness, i.e., preventing clients
from poisoning the training by sending forged gradients. We would further like to encourage research
on the multi-dimensional subset sum problem, the basis for our privacy guarantee.
Appendices
A Preprocessing
To transform the real-valued gradient vectors into vectors with entries from Z2m , there are two things
that we need to do: (1) upper bound the gradient entries and (2) represent them as non-negative
integers.
We first choose a number of bits m˜ to use for the representation of each entry, and the position
of the decimal point, i.e., how many bits are used for the integer and how many for the fractional
part. In the following we assume for simplicity and w.l.o.g. that all bits are used for the integer
part. If there exists an a priori bound on the gradient entries, this bound naturally determines the
number of integer bits. If no such bound is known, we can choose a large value for m˜, but might
still encounter gradients gti with one or more entries with absolute value larger or equal 2
m˜−1. We
project those gradients to the L∞ ball with radius 2m˜−1−1/2 around 0: gti ← (2m˜−1−1/2)gti/‖gti‖∞.
This operation, known as clipping, preserves the ratio of the gradient entries w.r.t. each other and is
commonly used in differentially private ML [1] and also non-differentially private neural network
training [27]. To obtain non-negative vectors, we replace each gti by g
t
i +(2
m˜−1−1/2)1, where 1
denotes the d-dimensional 1-vector. To reverse this transformation, the server can simply subtract
N(2m˜−1−1/2) from the final gt . Now all gti lie in [0,2m˜−1]d . We still need to discretize them to
integers. This can be done by, e.g., rounding the entries stochastically to the nearest integer, i.e., for
an integer i such that i≤ r ≤ i+1, we round r to i with probability r− i and to i+1 with probability
i+ m˜− r. In expectation, this doesn’t change the value of r. In the beginning we mentioned that we
would work in Z2m . We choose m≥ m˜+ log(N) so that the sum over all local gradients gti doesn’t
exceed 2m.
We would like to remark that the discretization of the gradients comes with only a small decrease in
model performance [18].
B Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7.
1. Let 2K(m)≤ cdm for c < 1. Let B and S both be chosen uniformly at random. Except with
probability exponentially small, there is no S′ 6= S such that fB(S) = fB(S′).
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2. Let 2K(m)≥ cdm for c > 1. Let B be chosen uniformly at random. Except with probability
exponentially small (w.r.t. the choice of B), the distribution given by fB(S) for a randomly
chosen S is quasi-random (w.r.t. S) within an exponentially small amount.
Proof.
1. Let S′ 6= S be a different K(m)-element subsets of the 2K(m)-element set B in d dimensions
with 2m bits per dimension. Then fB(S) and fB(S′) are independent uniformly random
vectors, as mentioned earlier. There are
(2K(m)
K(m)
)−1≤ 22K(m) possible choices for S′. Hence
we have
Pr(∃S′ 6= S : fB(S) = fB(S′))≤ ∑
S′ 6=S
Pr( fB(S) = fB(S′))
≤ 22K(m)2−dm ≤ 2−(1−c)dm.
2. Because fB(t) and fB(t ′) are independent and uniformly random w.r.t. the choice of B for
t 6= t ′, { fB}B⊂Zd2m ,|B|=2K(m) is a family of universal hash functions from {0,1}
2K(m) to Zd2m .
We can therefore apply the following lemma:
Lemma 8 (Leftover Hash Lemma [29]). Let U ⊂ {0,1}n, |U | ≥ 2l . Let e > 0 and let F
be an almost universal family of hash functions mapping n bits to l− 2e bits. Then the
distribution ( f , f (u)) is quasi-random within 1/2e (on the set F×{0,1}l−2e), where f is
chosen uniformly at random from F, and u uniformly from U.
Since we only allow subset sums where exactly half of the vectors is summed up, the
domain of our hash functions is restricted to U = {v ∈ {0,1}2K(m) : ‖v‖1 = K(m)}. This
set has a cardinality of
(2K(m)
K(m)
) ≥ 22K(m)/(2K(m)+1) = 22K(m)−log(2K(m)+1), whereas the
domain of fB has cardinality 2dm. We thus get e = 2K(m)− log(2K(m) + 1)− dm ≤
(c−1−O(log(dm)/dm))dm for the e from Lemma 8, which yields, for all T ⊂ {0,1}dm:
E
B
|Pr
u
( fB(u) ∈ T )− |T |2dm |< 2
−(c−1−O( log(dm)dm ))dm.
Because this bound on the expectation w.r.t. B is exponential, Markov’s inequality asserts
that an exponential bound holds for all but an exponentially small fraction of all B:
Pr
B
(|Pr
u
( fB(u) ∈ T )− |T |2dm | ≥ 2
− c−12 dm)≤ 2−( c−12 −O( log(dm)dm ))dm.
C Protecting the Global Gradient via Differential Privacy
Just the value of the global gradient itself — that we allow the server to learn — can already reveal
all values of the local gradients, as the following example shows.
Assume that there are only two clients, the dataset of each one consisting of only one entry, a positive
scalar feature value, x1 = 1 and x2 = 2, respectively. The loss function that should be minimized is
L(w,x) = 1x e
wx−w, w ∈ R with ∂L(w,x)/∂w = ewx− 1. In the first iteration, the server sends the
parameter w = −1, in the second iteration w = 1, and receives the global gradients e−1 + e−2− 2
and e+ e2− 2, respectively. From these two global gradients and with the knowledge that there
are exactly two clients, the server can reconstruct the local gradients from the resulting system of
equations
(1) ex1 + ex2 = e+ e2, (2) e−x1 + e−x2 = e−1+ e−2,
which can be uniquely solved (up to exchanging x1 and x2) using the substitutions x˜1 = ex1 , x˜2 = ex2 .
To prevent such leakage of information through the global gradient, we ensure differential privacy
(DP) for this sum by adding noise.
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Definition 9 (Differential Privacy ([12])). A randomized algorithm M with domain N|X | for a
set X is (ε,δ )-differentially private if, for all S ⊂ Range(M ) and for all x,y ∈ N|X | such that
‖x− y‖1 ≤ 1,
Pr(M (x) ∈S )≤ eε Pr(M (y) ∈S )+δ .
Differential privacy means that an adversary that gets the output of algorithm M is not able to
determine whether an individual in N|X | participated in the data collection or not, even with arbitrary
side information aboutM and the dataset.
Client level vs. sample level DP. While Thm. 1 from the main paper is concerned with hiding
the participation of entire clients (with a dataset consisting of possibly many training samples), in
most cases only the weaker guarantee of hiding the participation of an individual training sample is
considered in the DP literature. Both can be combined with our protocol. The combination of client
level DP with our protocol is straight-forward. When combining sample level DP with it, Thm. 1 does
not directly apply. However, one can in this case assume a stronger server that knows the gradient of
the client in whose dataset the attacked sample is potentially contained, and make the adversary’s
task easier by only requiring them to detect whether this client participated in the training or not.
Hence, the analogue of Thm. 1 for gradients of individual training samples holds. In the following
we consider the more common case of sample level DP.
A standard way to achieve DP in gradient-based training is to add noise to the gradients. The
variance of the noise is chosen based on the desired level of privacy, the number of training iterations
and the sensitivity of the gradient to changes in the data. The very common Gaussian mechanism
achieves (ε,δ )-DP for a d-dimensional function f by adding noise from the d-dimensional Gaussian
N (0,σ2I) [12], where
σ2 >
∆2
ε
√
2ln
(
1.25
δ
)
.
Here ∆2 is the L2-sensitivity of f , i.e., how much its value changes at most in L2-norm when one
entry in the database that is used as its argument is changed. In our case this would be the maximum
L2-norm of the loss function L. We already have the bound
√
d2m˜ on L due to the bound of 2m˜ on
all entries of the d-dim. gradients. This bound, however, could be very loose and we can enforce
a tighter bound by using clipping w.r.t. the L2-norm, as done in Sec. 4.1 for the L∞-norm. If one
were to use DP without our protocol, one would need to addN (0,σ2I) to every client’s gradient,
resulting in NN (0,σ2I) =N (0,Nσ2I) total noise, because we need to ensure DP for every single
summand of gt . In contrast, with our protocol summands are not revealed to the server, and hence DP
only needs to be ensured for the sum gt . If we assume N˜ honest clients, each client would hence only
need to addN (0,σ2/N˜I) to their gradient. Thus, by using SecGD, the amount of noise necessary to
achieve DP for the global gradient reduces fromN (0,Nσ2I) toN (0,(1+N− N˜)σ2I).
DP over multiple training iterations can be ensured by using a composition theorem, e.g., [12, 1].
The effects of the addition of noise to the gradients on the model performance are well explored in
the literature and have been shown to be small [1].
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